Coalition today: to build or not to build by Research, Update
Coalition today: to build or not to build
No. 11/212, March 12 2001
The current political crisis is Ukraine is adopting new - or rather - well-forgotten old - features. In
addition to the de facto collapse of the parliamentary majority (though de jure none of the 281 MPs
who belong to the majority - including the opposition activists like Oleksandr Turchynov - has
submitted his or her formal withdrawal from the coalition originally designed to serve as support for
the President and the government), multiplied by the «tapegate», the Gongadze case and activities of
political opposition, the current situation features the return to public debates about prospects for the
establishment of a coalition government in Ukraine.
Paradoxical as it may sound, the phrase «coalition government» in the current context was produced by
the Cabinet of Ministers. As the Cabinet's official representative in the parliament Serhiy Sobolev put
it, «unfortunately, and I admit it, the phrase «coalition government» emerged from inside the Cabinet
of Ministers» (Kievskiy Telegraph, February 5, 2001). Yet, it appears that the government and the
parliament interpreted the phrase in a different way. Perspectives expressed, and conditions made by
potential participants of the «coalition-building» process were also too different for the project to be
implemented. According to Sobolev, none of the consultation meetings with nine parliamentary
factions and groups addressed the issue of forming a coalition government (Kievskiy Telegraph,
February 5, 2001). Yet, a few days later the parliament's official newspaper informed that Prime
Minister Victor Yushchenko had had consultations with parliamentary factions and groups about the
possibility to form a coalition government but in the context of forming a working group designed for
«preparing a memorandum about solidarity-based responsibility of the government and the parliament
for the pursuit of the reforms» (Holos Ukrainy, February 8, 2001). Hence, in the current context Victor
Yushchenko advocated not as much the idea of coalition-building as such, but linked the coalition to
the matter of signing a memorandum on solidarity-based responsibility of the executive and the
legislative branches.
The memorandum idea is about a year old, but so far has proved to be impossible to achieve. For the
government the recreation of the «well-forgotten old business» appears to be a logical step towards
more political security, given the de facto break-up of the parliamentary majority and the overt
dissatisfaction of some influential factions of the majority with Victor Yushchenko. Yet, it has been
clear that the implementation of such a plan is badly complicated by a number of political obstacles
that make a compromise next to impossible. For instance, according to Deputy Speaker Stepan
Havrysh, «steps towards institutionalization of a coalition government should include implementation
of results of the all-Ukrainian referendum and the adoption of the law on the parliamentary majority
and the parliamentary opposition. That would allow harmonization of relations between the branches of
power» (Holos Ukrainy, February 8, 2001). In the midst of the current crisis the conditions are rather
hard to meet.
Yet, the list of proposed compromises was not limited to the above conditions. Another prerequisite for
signing the solidarity memorandum was the tentative «coalition government». The demand was made
public by First Vice Speaker Victor Medvedchuk in early February 2001. Explaining his position and
that of the SDPU(o) faction, Medvedchuk announced that Victor Yushchenko's statements about the
coalition government «remain but declarations… It is the coalition government, and not the
memorandum of cooperation would really assist cooperation between the government and the
parliament» (Den, February 10, 2001). In this case we are dealing with two opposite interpretations of
possible conditions for forming a coalition government in Ukraine. Hence, the first word in the
coalition debate has been said.
The situation developed fast. The parliamentary majority itself featured a broad variety of views and
opinions about possible coalition. For instance, leader of the Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv Oleksandr
Volkov referred to the idea of forming a coalition government as a «myth», arguing that a coalition
government would require «changing the relevant article of the Constitution» (Segodnya, February 12,
2001). At about the same time his faction rejected an offer to meet the Prime Minister.
Some other parliamentary factions continued to insist on building a coalition government. Victor
Medvedchuk publicly claimed that the only thing that could «save» the Prime Minister was «to form a
coalition government of representatives of parliamentary groups» (Fakty i Kommentarii, February 13,
2001). In his turn, Victor Yushchenko, trying to delay the prospect of forming a coalition under the
current political circumstances and divert the threat to his own ability to keep the office - argued that in
order to build a coalition government there is a need to «have a coalition of politicians and a law on the
Cabinet of Ministers» (Uriadovyi Kurrier, February 16, 2001). According to Yushchenko, that would
regulate and formalize a framework for relations between the government and the parliament and,
therefore, would finally clear the issue of solidarity-based responsibility.
At the end of February the passionate debate about a coalition government entered a new stage marked
by Medvedchuk's statement that the Yushchenko government would survive provided the President, the
parliament and the government agreed on building a coalition government. The statement emphasized
the current realities and prospects for the broken-up parliamentary majority. He also called for a
«moratorium» on talks about the disintegration of the parliamentary majority and suggested to wait
«whether the current majority would split up, whether another pro-reform majority would exist that
would support a different government led by a different Prime Minister».
The Vice Speaker formulated his challenge bluntly: «Either the government takes the way of
cooperation with the parliamentary majority through the creation of a coalition government, and adopts
shared responsibility, or in April the majority creates a new coalition government with a new premier
who will meet [the criteria of] cooperation between the branches of power,» said Medvedchuk (Holos
Ukrainy, February 27, 2001).
The SDPU (o) is not alone in pushing for a coalition government. Some time ago leader of the Trudova
Ukraina Serhiy Tihipko announced he supported Victor Medvedchuk’s idea about the coalition
government, and stressed that the Trudova Ukraina had called for it before. According to Tihipko – a
politician who left the government less than a year ago to become an MP – «the matter is not about
specific personalities… the question is not find a way to preserve the parliamentary majority that would
constructively work for one more year that is left before the elections.» Tihipko described the
mechanism, needed to form such a government, as «real» consultations for «discussing the platform on
which the unification could take place, and the composition of the future majority, as well as specific
personalities that could join the government.» Only after that, according to Tihipko, it would be time to
«discuss specific positions and steps» that would «legally enhance such a government», in particular,
by means of approving the law on the Cabinet of Ministers (Den, February 28, 2001).
Victor Yushchenko responded to the challenge by arguing that Vice Speaker Medvedchuk’s statement
was «an attempt to change the future of Ukraine». He stressed that the government would never agree
to the «ultimatum-like dialogue with any political force» (Chas, March 2, 2001). Commenting on
Medvedchuk’s statements, Yushchenko argued they were «a clear attempt to break up the
parliamentary majority and, finally, the only [method] of becoming the leader of the parliament through
the collapse of the majority (UNIAN, February 28, 2001).
On March 2 Yushchenko made another, rather symbolic statement about foundations for building a
coalition government in the current political environment. He argued that the issue of forming a
coalition government was «not an object of work» and added that «nobody authorized the government
to form a coalition government, this is not logical, because the whole motivation for forming a
coalition government goes primarily through the formation of the coalition» (UNIAN, March 2, 2001).
Hence, the present «battle» for a coalition government did not result in anything. President Leonid
Kuchma summarized the debate on March 6 by supporting the position of Prime Minister Yushchenko
in his «coalition conflict» with the leadership of the parliament. The demonstration of support
suggested that the Yushchenko government is unlikely to be replaced shortly by some other players.
The President called on the rival politicians to stop talking about new principles of forming the
government and added a traditional counter-argument to coalition-building efforts: «first of all, the
government should be professional» (Interfax-Ukraina, March 6, 2001).
Ironically, similar arguments were used by the President for the same reason in March 1998 – though
the question was about the government of Valery Pustovoitenko, and the discussion took place before
the 1998 parliamentary elections. The Pustovoitenko government survived notwithstanding the
remarkably poor performance of Pustovoitenko’s People’s Democratic Party, then informally referred
to as the «party of power». Shortly before the elections President Kuchma announced at a major
national conference of taxation officers that he «strongly believed that Ukraine needs not a coalition
government but a professional one. That is, the [government] in which the determining [factor] will not
be party affiliation but professional knowledge and capability to organize work» (Uriadovyi Kurrier,
March 12, 1998). While personalities and political circumstances have changed since then, the attitude
to the issue is still there.
Generally, ideas about the need to form a coalition government emerge in Ukraine in times of trouble
and political uncertainty. Initially the idea to form a coalition government emerged in the
Pustovoitenko government. The idea was broadly discussed after the 1998 parliamentary elections.
While discussions did not go any further, at that point the idea of a coalition government was firmly
linked to the formation of a parliamentary majority, its political affiliations, and the election of the
leadership of the parliament. The lengthy period of bargaining and lobbying that accompanied the
election of Speaker provided a number of indicators of the condition of the political process. It could be
illustrated with the opinion of Vyacheslav Chornovil, then leader of the single Rukh: negotiations with
political parties represented in the parliament about forming a coalition government could start only
after the election of the Speaker. «If he [i.e., the Speaker] is a left-winger, then we are not going to talk
about any coalition government» (Nezavisimost, April 29, 1998). The bargaining over the election of
the Speaker finalized the coalition illusions: «if a right-wing majority is formed in the parliament, the
government, therefore, must be right-wing. If the parliamentary majority happens to be left-wing, then
the left will have to form the government. <…> And we know from the «glorious» experience what
consequences of a so-called coalition may be» (Segodnya, June 10, 1998), - argued Yuri Kostenko, ex-
Minister of the Environment in the governments led by Yevhen Marchuk, Pavlo Lazarenko and Valery
Pustovoitenko. Naturally, the 1998 attempts to build a coalition government produced no tangible
result.
The issue of coalition-building – or rather, political discussions about it – was back on the agenda
during the 1999 presidential election campaign. Then the idea of forming a coalition government was
cautiously endorsed by almost all representatives of the Ukrainian branches of power. As before,
coalition-building was linked to the formation of the parliamentary majority. As then ordinary member
of the parliament, and later Vice Speaker Stepan Havrysh put it in October 1999, «the whole attitude to
the Cabinet of Ministers must be changed. Since nowadays we are increasingly aware of political
responsibility of the Verkhovna Rada, we must come to the point of forming a coalition government as
an instrument of political responsibility» (Ukraina Moloda, October 12, 1999). Between the two rounds
of the presidential elections Leonid Kuchma publicly announced: «I really want to have majority in the
parliament. And that majority, together with the President, must form a coalition government»
(Vysokyi Zamok, November 12, 1999).
Talks about a coalition government became more assertive after President Leonid Kuchma was re-
elected as a result of the November 1999 run-off, and the Pustovoitenko government had to leave the
political stage. The parliamentary factions and interest groups that supported Leonid Kuchma's re-
election ambitions wanted their dividends in the form of seats in the government. As in 1998, the
notions of «coalition» and «majority» were used together in the political context. For instance, leader
of the Green faction Vitaly Kononov argued that «the parliamentary majority is the order of the time. If
we do not create it, the parliament will have to be dissolved… As far as the formation of a coalition
government is concerned, I think it's possible because it is necessary.» Commenting on prospects for
establishing a coalition government, Serhiy Teriokhin said «if the concept of a coalition government is
adopted, I do not exclude a possibility that the parliament will agree to forming such a government»
(Holos Ukrainy, November 20, 1999). The idea of a coalition government was rejected by the
Communists: «speaking about a coalition government in contemporary Ukraine is, at least, not serious.
Such talks only shield the President's strife to shift responsibility for the collapse in the state from
himself to the government,» Hennady Kriuchkov argued. Obviously, as the losers, Communists could
not hope to receive seats in the government, though after all the current government, repeatedly
described as a team of pro-reform co-thinkers, does include a Communist, Minister of Labor and Social
Security Ivan Sakhan.
After Victor Yushchenko was approved as prime Minister by the parliament on December 23, 1999,
the parliament seemed to lose enthusiasm about forming a coalition government - at least the issue of
making a «classic» version of a coalition-based Cabinet of Ministers was not discussed. Leonid
Kuchma gave Yushchenko «the initiative of forming the government's team» and the government was
formed through «daily consultations» not only with representatives of «political forces in the
Verkhovna Rada», but also with people of «moral authority in the Ukrainian society» (Den, December
30, 1999), as presidential chief of staff Volodymyr Lytvyn put it. In his turn, one of Yushchenko's most
consistent supporters in the Ukrainian parliament, leader of the Party of Reform and Order Victor
Pynzenyk publicly announced that «Yushchenko has taken an absolutely right position: to have neither
political nor economic bargaining, for the idea of a coalition government is very good if there are
ideologically close factions that form the majority. In the circumstances when there is a variety of
ideologies and substantial differences in economic interests, a coalition government is doomed to
failure. For Yushchenko it is important to have a united team.» Given interests of other political
influence groups, Yushchenko's views on the way to form the government did not gain their
enthusiastic support. In this context it is hard to disagree with the opinion expressed by Volodymyr
Lytvyn: «What everyone wants most of all today is to divide and appoint to positions» (Den, December
30, 1999). The statement may serve as a good description of the understanding of a «coalition
government» by the Ukrainian political elite.
Later on, in March 2000, after the «velvet revolution» in the parliament and the establishment of the
parliamentary majority, Speaker Ivan Pliushch announced he believed the creation of a coalition
government was « far from the best option». He explained his view in very simply: «there can be no
talks about any coalition» for «in order to talk about a coalition government one has to have vacancies»
(Vysokyi Zamok, March 24, 2000). There were so such vacancies in the government at the moment,
the Speaker stressed.
However, besides free offices in Ukrainian ministries and departments that would be suitable for
satisfying aspirations of political influence groups, when forming a coalition government there is a
need to take into account an obvious - though very difficult for all Ukrainian governments - issue of the
government's political accountability. This aspect is a key reason for institutionalization of relations
between the Cabinet and the parliament. However, besides considering different interests in the
coalition that are expressed by parliamentary factions, some legal issues also have to be taken into
account, - primarily the fact that the issue of a coalition government does not have a legal definition,
and that all efforts to create a legal framework for it so far have proved to be feckless. No matter
whether members of the parliament, the Presidential administration and the executive branch have been
unable or unwilling to agree on the matter, but the fact is that the current Ukrainian legislation lacks
provisions regulating establishment and operation of a coalition government. The notion of a
«coalition» is not present in the Constitution or other laws. The draft bill «On the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine», approved in 1997, has not become a law for years, and even the current «frozen» version
lacks provisions for a coalition government. The current Cabinet of Ministers operates in accordance
with the Soviet-time law «On the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR» that has only undergone
some «face-lifting». Hence, in order for a coalition government to become a legitimate reality, a
massive law-making effort is needed - from adopting a law on the Cabinet of Ministers to amending the
Constitution. Neither appears to be realistic today.
Speaking about prospects for forming a coalition government in Ukraine, one should take into account
the current political crisis and the fact that the Yushchenko government will lose its «immunity» in
about a month. The one-year term since the approval of the government's Program of Action by the
parliament, during which the parliament cannot initiate the dismissal of the government (as stipulated
by the Constitution) expires on April 15. Given the deterioration of the parliamentary majority and
weakening of Yushchenko's positions in the parliament, rival political interest groups have chosen a
good moment for bargaining about a coalition government. However, the lack of adequate legislation
and the current political reality limit the issue of a coalition government to the level of bargaining about
individual positions in the current government and possible situational reshuffles in the Cabinet. The
strongest incentive to fight for seats in the government is the access to administrative and budget
resources that will be critical for the success of political parties and interest groups' candidates at the
forthcoming parliamentary elections due in March 2002. It looks like the mixed election system will be
preserved, and, therefore, 50% of the seats in the 450-member parliament will be elected through
majoritarian constituencies. In this context the strife for a «coalition government» is directly linked to
the strife for control of the administrative and budget resources at the elections. The combination of
these factors is expected to be the necessary source of control over processes in this country. Logically,
the relations between the government and the parliament are bound to continue to be complicated with
bargaining for seats in the executive offices and «coalition» claims. The access to the administrative
and budget resources will not lose significance after the 2002 parliamentary race, as the country will
face an even more important, presidential race in 2004.
